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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann: 78-2a-3 (2)(h)(Supp. 2001) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 
The trial court action was tried upon the facts, without a jury, and as required by Rule 52 
(a) of the U R Civ P, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an amended 
decree of divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION AT TRIAL COURT 
The issues raised in Merae's cross-appeal are as follows: 
L Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the finding that the money 
received by James from forging and altering Merae's checks was used for family purposes 
benefitting all members of the family, including James? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Merae's Rule 59 (b) motion to amend the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and amended decree of divorce a) to find that James used the $142,647 
he obtained by forging and altering Merae's checks for non-family purposes and b) to grant 
judgment in the amount of $142,647 in Merae's favor and against James? 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that Merae should be held in contempt of court for 
violating court orders? 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable to the three issues stated above is 
the Clearly Erroneous Standard. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. See Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P. 2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991). As 
to the contempt issue, see Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P. 2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
Issue preservation in trial court: The issues stated above were preserved in the trial court 
by Merae's motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, and amended decree of 
divorce, see R 3751. 
4. Did the trial court err in deciding not to award sanction against James' counsel under 
Rule 11 (b) (3) of the U R Civ P? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review applicable to this issue is the Correction of 
Error Standard. Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law, 
therefore, an appellate court reviews the trial court's determination that a violation has occurred, 
for correctness. See Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P. 2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issue preservation in trial court: The issue stated above was preserved in the trial court by 
Merae's motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the U R Civ P, see R 3820. 
STATEMENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED CASES 
The subjects of this consolidated appeal are two bench trials presided over by the 
Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The first, a divorce lawsuit, the "divorce case" herein, was 
brought by James Lewis Kimball, "James" herein, against his wife, Merae Kimball, "Merae" 
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herein. James appealed. The second case was brought by Merae, against James for fraud and 
unjust enrichment, the "fraud case" herein. James appealed. 
The divorce case involved custody of the parties' four children and money. The custody 
issue was resolved prior to the trial by a stipulation of the parties that was approved by the trial 
court and reduced to an order, see R 3526. 
The fourteen day bench trial that followed was about the money remaining in Merae's 
Fidelity Account when the parties separate in February of 2002. While there were ancillary 
issues, the primary claim made by James was that the Fidelity Account money was a marital asset 
because it did not result from a gift, nor was it inheritance, and if it was inheritance, it was co-
mingled. James also made a claim for his attorney's fees. 
Merae claimed that the Fidelity Account money was a result of her sale of the 1005 
Shares she received from her father, and that it was never her intent to make those funds a part of 
the marital estate. She also claimed that she is entitled to a judgment against James for $160,467 
because he altered and forged her name on her Fidelity Account checks. Under cross-
examination, James admitted to altering and forging Merae's Fidelity Account checks but 
claimed he was entitled to do so because he and Merae were married, and that he used the money 
he obtained through altering and forging Merae's checks for family purposes. 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled 1) that the 1005 Shares were Merae's 
inheritance, 2) that the funds in Merae's Fidelity Account at the time the parties separated were 
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not part of the marital estate, 3) that James had, without authorization, forged and altered 
Merae's Fidelity Account checks and used the money for family purposes. The court did not 
award James attorney fees because James did not prevail on the main issue of the case and 
because the fees were unreasonable and unnecessary. 
James filed an appeal challenging the trial court's findings, claiming, among other things, 
that the findings of fact should not have been signed because they do not correspond with the 
findings and rulings of the trial court. 
In response, Merae filed a cross-appeal claiming, among other things, that she is entitled 
to a judgment against James for $142,467 representing the money he took from altering and 
forging her checks. 
The fraud case was brought by Merae against her banks under §70A-4-401 Utah Code 
Ann. (Supp. 1993), because they processed and paid checks on her Fidelity Account that had 
been altered and forged, and against James for fraud and unjust enrichment, because he altered 
and forged checks on her Fidelity Account and took the money. 
Merae's claims against her banks were dismissed pursuant to pretrial motions because the 
statute of limitations had run and her claim against James for fraud was dismissed at trial. 
However, after hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that 1] James, without the consent or 
knowledge of Merae and without any right so to do, took Merae's money by either altering check 
amounts or drawing checks with James or "Cash" as the payee, by forging the signature of 
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Merae 2] James was injustly enriched in that he took money to which he was not entitled 3] 
James' actions constitute theft and forgery and he deceived Merae into believing he was working 
4] Merae relegated administration of the family finances and investments to James and she did 
not participate in their day-to-day management 5] James took improper advantage of his 
managerial position and Merae's minimal participation and oversight 6] At least for the altered 
checks and those made payable to James or "Cash", the proceeds were not used to financially 
support James' family 7] These are the circumstances and the "misleading acts" that would make 
it inequitable for James to retain the proceeds 8] It is reasonable that Merae be awarded a 
judgment against James in the sum of $56,800 together with pre-judgment interest on each check 
from the date thereon, if the date is visible, to the date of judgment and, thereafter, at the legal 
rate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
James has apparently either misunderstood or ignored his duty, as a matter of law and as 
the appellant in these consolidated cases, to marshal the evidence. "The appealing party has the 
burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict [ruling] and then showing that it is 
insufficient." Fitz v. Svnthes (TJSAI 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). In his Brief, rather than 
meeting his burden of marshaling the evidence, James selectively presented as "facts" those 
portions of testimony that are most favorable to his argument on appeal while, at the same time, 
omitted critical evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Thus, James has failed in his duty 
5 
to marshal (as is discussed further below). As a consequence, Merae has identified below certain 
critical facts (with citations to the Record) that support the trial court's findings. While not 
exhaustive as to James' appeal (since Merae does not have the marshaling burden in that 
respect), the facts presented below were adduced at trial and lend support to the trial court's 
findings, but were otherwise ignored by James in his recitation of selective material facts. 
As to the cross-appeal, the marshaling requirement is a little different. In that respect, the 
trial court 1) denied Merae's Rule 59 (b) motion and ruled that there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support a finding that James used the proceeds he obtained by forging and 
altering Merae's checks for family purposes, 2) denied her demand for a judgment in the amount 
of $160,467 against James, 3) ruled that Merae was in contempt of court for violating court 
orders relative to visitation, and 4) denied Merae's motion for sanctions against James' counsel 
under Rule 11 (b)(3) of the U R Civ P. 
The evidence presented at trial relative to the finding that James used, for family 
purposes, the proceeds he obtained by forging and altering Merae's checks, is: 
1. On February 26th, 1996, Merae opened the Fidelity Account, see Page 2 of Ex R 9,10, 
15,16,17, and 18. 
2. Merae's Fidelity Account was an "individual account", not a joint account with James, 
see Ex R 12. 
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3. James testified that the Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies from the sale of 
the 1005 Shares, see Tr 890 L 11-12. 
4. James knew that the Fidelity Account was Merae's individual account, see Tr 1283 L 
10-25. 
5. Merae claims that she never gave James the authority to sign her name on Fidelity 
Account checks, see Tr 1510 L 1-3. 
6. James claims that he had "trading privileges" on the Fidelity Account, see Tr 892 L 1, 
but produced no documentation to support his claim, see Tr 892 L 22-25, Tr 893 L 5. 
7. James claimed that he could sign his own name on Fidelity Account checks, see Tr 897 
L 2-4, Tr 1313 L 24, and Tr 1314 L 1-3, hut produced no documentation to support his claim. 
8. James never signed his name to a Fidelity Account check but forged Merae's name on 
several Fidelity Account checks, see Ex R 13,14 and P 1933,1934, 1935,1937,1939,1940, 
1941 and 1942 and FEx P 1-42. 
9. Between June of 1999, and August of 2000, Merae gave James six $1,000 checks on 
her Fidelity Account, that she had signed and made payable to James, see Ex R 13. 
10. On December 8th, 2004, James stated, under oath, when asked if he altered Ex PI936, 
"Ummm, one of us did," see Tr 923 L 21-25. 
11. On December 15th, 2004, during the divorce trial, James admitted, under oath, that he 
altered Ex P 1936 and other checks given to him by Merae, by changing the arabic number " 1 " to 
a "4", and writing an "F" in front of the "One" and cashing them, see Tr 1277 L 13-16. 
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12. Between June of 1998 and December of 2001, James forged Merae's signature on her 
Fidelity Account checks, and deposited or cashed them, see Ex R 14. 
13. The total amount of funds received by James, from altering and forging Fidelity 
Account checks, was $142,467, see Ex R 13 and Ex R 14. 
14. None of the checks had notations on them, describing the reason the check was 
written or issued, see Ex R 13 and Ex R 14. 
15. James testified that the funds he received from forging and altering checks in the 
Fidelity Account, were used for "maintenance of our home, recreation, food, clothing, medical 
needs, and other costs associated with running our household", see Tr 951 L 7-10, Tr 952 L 22-
24, Tr 957 L 17-21, Tr 959 L 1-2, Tr 960 L 16-18, Tr 962 L 25, and Tr 963 L 1-2. 
16. James did not present receipts, invoices, or other documents showing how he utilized 
the $142,467. 
17. James did not tell Merae what he did with the $142,467, see Tr 1512 L 1-4. 
18. James claimed that he had authority to sign Merae's name on her Fidelity Account 
checks, because "We were a couple, we were married, we were a unit, I don't know". See Tr 
1316 L 16. 
The evidence presented at trial, relative to the finding that Merae was in contempt of 
court for violating court orders relative to visitation, is: 
1. Commissioner Bradford certified the issue of Merae's contempt relative to visitation, 
on one occasion prior to the date that the parties reached a stipulation that settled all disputes 
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between them relative to child custody, parent-time, and related matters, see recommendation 
dated 9/15/03. 
2. On November 29th, 2004, the parties entered into a stipulation and agreement relative 
to custody of the minor children, parent-time, and related matters, and their agreement was 
memorialized by the trial court's order dated March 10th, 2005, see R 3526. 
3. At paragraph 12 of the order, it is stated that all matters related to custody of the minor 
children and related matters were settled, and that the only issues reserved for trial were: 
A. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the 
same. 
B. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court-appointed 
evaluation, including the costs for any and all experts from both parties 
concerning the custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved. 
C. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same. 
The evidence set forth in the trial court record, relative to the court's order by minute 
entry, dated February 21st, 2006, R 4063, stating that James' counsel did not mislead the court, is 
as follows: 
1. Ex R 6 was filled out by James, see Tr 1278 L 15-21. 
2. The document was signed by James, on December 29th, 2000, see Tr 1278 L 25 and Tr 
1279 L 1-2. 
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3. Testimony given by David Ingles, a representative of the Larry H. Miller Group, was 
to the effect that Ex R 6 was completed by James and submitted to the Larry H. Miller Group and 
Zions Bank in connection with his request for a loan to purchase a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban, see 
Tr 1387 L 15-22 and Tr 1388 L 5-12. (This was the Replacement Suburban.) 
4. The last line of the "Applicant" section of Ex R 6, states that James' trade or 
occupation is "sales" and his gross monthly income is "$60,000." 
5. Section VIE "Credit Application", at page 13-14 of the memorandum signed by 
Wendy J. Lems, attorney for James, on November 10th, 2005, R 3842-3, states that "At time of 
trial, the Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application meant "per 
year" and such was a mere inadvertence." 
6. A thorough review of the trial transcript of the testimony of James shows that the 
statement of James set forth in Ms. Lems November 10th, 2005 memorandum does not exist. 
7. The only testimony given by James, at the trial concerning his income, was that 
between 1989 and 1993, the household brought in $60,000 plus on an average year, see Tr 718 
L I . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
James, who is the Appellant in both appeals, has failed to marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings in both the divorce case and the fraud case and then 
demonstrate that, despite such marshaled evidence, the findings are against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Instead, he has selectively presented and skewed evidence to support his arguments 
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on appeal in effect rearguing the merits of his case before this appellate court. There was 
insufficient evidence presented at trial to show that James used the money he received from 
forging and altering Merae's checks for family purposes. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court 
on this point should be reversed and Merae should be awarded a $142,467 judgment against 
James. 
In the parties' settlement of the custody issues, the questions of Merae's contempt were 
not reserved for trial, therefore, they should not have been considered and ruled upon by the trial 
court. 
Evidence presented to the trial court by Merae's motion under Rule 11 U R Civ P clearly 
shows that James' counsel intentionally misrepresented a material fact to mislead the trial court 
and should have been sanctioned. 
James has also failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings in 
the fraud case. 
ARGUMENT 
L JAMES HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF MARSHALING THE 
EVIDENCE. 
In challenging the rulings of the trial court and the rulings' associated factual findings in 
the two cases consolidated on appeal, James must proceed in two steps. First, he must marshal all 
the evidence that supports the rulings. Second, he must then demonstrate that, despite the 
marshaled evidence, the rulings and associated findings are so lacking in support as to be 
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"against the clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. See Doelle v. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P. 
2d 467,470 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, James has a high standard to meet in marshaling the evidence. "In order to 
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith Assocs^ 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis in original, quoting West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991)). "Once appellants have 
established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 'must ferret out fatal flaw 
in the evidence' and show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings." 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 
1994), quoting West Valley, 818 P.2d at 1314. An appellant fails to meet his burden of 
marshaling where he ignores evidence supportive of a jury's verdict [or rulings of the trial court] 
and associated findings, and instead selectively marshals only evidence supportive of his 
position, since to do so is tantamount to improperly rearguing the merits of his case before the 
appellate court. Interiors Contracting, supra and Oneida, supra. Therefore, when an appellant 
fails to adequately marshal the evidence for the reviewing appellate court, that court should 
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." 
Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P 2.d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) 
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James' appeal questions whether the trial court abused its discretion on several issues. 
Ergo, James must successfully challenge the factual findings upon which the trial court's 
decision depended. 
When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive use of its discretionary 
powers, they "must successfully challenge the factual findings upon 
which the trial court's decision... depended." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, n. 14 100 P.3d 1177. This requires that parties marshal the 
evidence. As we have previously explained, parties who ask this 
court to consider fact-sensitive questions- including those questions 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard- have a duty to marshal 
all the evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's ruling. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2005 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200, 1208-09. 
Even where the defendants purport to challenge on ly the legal ruling, 
as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of 
a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have 
a duty to marshal the evidence. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 20, 100 
P. 3d 1177. Where an appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, we need 
not consider the challenge to the sufficiency f the evidence. See Tanner v. 
Carter, 2001 UT 18 ^ [17,20 P.2d 332. Cache County v. Beus, 128 
P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2005). 
Therefore, if a party does not meet their marshaling requirement, then the appellate court 
may presume that the findings were valid and affirm those findings. Then, once the appellate 
court affirms the findings of fact, then they also may affirm the trial court's conclusion that arose 
from those facts. 
As is apparent from a comparison between Merae's "Statement of Facts" section above 
and the selective "Statement of Facts" adduced by James in his brief, a number of important 
pieces of evidence presented to the trial court and supportive of the trial court's findings were not 
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cited by James in his brief. Instead of presenting such supportive evidence and attempting to 
demonstrate its insufficiency, James presented this appellate court with the selective version of 
the facts that James thinks the trial court should have accepted at the trial. In other words, James 
selected facts favorable to his theory of the consolidated cases, while wholly ignoring those facts 
supportive of the findings of the trial court. Rather than properly marshaling the evidence as 
required, James selectively presented facts favorable to his argument on appeal in a misplaced 
and inappropriate effort to reargue the merits of his case before this appellate court. Because 
James has failed in his basic threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence, the trial 
court's findings on both cases consolidated on appeal must stand. 
Additionally, James not only failed to cite certain material facts supportive of the findings 
of the trial court, he goes a step further to actually misrepresent or skew the nature of certain facts 
adduced in his brief. In analyzing James' arguments as contained in his brief, it should be noted 
that a number of them are built on assumptions that he reached in his arguments before the trial 
court, but which the trial court did not accept and in fact, are contradicted by testimony. 
Some examples are: 
1. In James' Fact No. 4, the claim is made that during their marriage, the parties enjoyed 
and extravagant and luxurious lifestyle, and traveled all over the World and U.S. This statement 
is misleading because it omits the following material facts: 
A. Prior to March of 1995, when Merae sold her 1005 Shares, the parties had no 
savings, no boat, drove high-mileage used cars, the checks to pay their monthly 
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house payment bounced on at least two occasions, and their checking account at 
Bank One was frequently overdrawn and checks returned, see Tr-1295 L 24-25, 
Tr 1296 L 1-25. 
B. After Merae sold her 1005 Shares, the parties drove new automobiles, 
purchased a 26 foot Sea Ray boat, became members of the University of Utah 
Crimson Club, enjoying its associated benefits, and had savings accounts, treasury 
bills, the Fidelity Account, and enjoyed, with their four children, cruises, 
vacations, and sporting events wherever they were played, see Tr-i297-8. 
2. It is represented at James' Fact No. 4, that the parties' "jet-set" lifestyle was funded, in 
part, by James' salary and commissions. This statement is untrue because James did not earn 
enough money to contribute to the parties' lifestyle, see Tr 1298 L 20-25. 
A. James earned $2,391 in 1998, see Ex P1346. 
B. James earned -$61 in 1999, see Ex P1350. 
C. James earned $600 in 2000, see Ex P1354. 
D. James earned $1,748 in 2001, see Ex P1358. 
3. One other area where James misrepresents the facts by omitting to state material facts 
related to the issue is set forth at Point II on page 36 of his Brief. James states that" he filed a 
Rule 60 (b) motion.... because the findings of fact drafted by Merae's counsel, did not accurately 
reflect the trial court's rulings". This statement fails to state facts material to the issue, which are: 
15 
A. At the conclusion of the ruling hearing, the trial court directed Merae's counsel 
to draft the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an amended decree of 
divorce* reflecting the court's rulings. 
B. The papers were prepared by Merae's counsel and hand-delivered to James' 
counsel on September 6th, 2005. 
C. James' counsel filed no timely objections to the papers under Rule 7 (f)(2) of 
the U R Civ P, and on September 19th, 2005, the trial court signed the papers, on 
September 20th, the clerk entered them, R 3726, and on September 21st, the 
amended decree of divorce was entered in the registry of judgments, R 3746. 
D. On November 10th, 2005, James filed objections to the papers, see R 3882. 
E. The only post-trial motion filed by James was the Rule 60 (b) motion submitted 
on November 10th, 2005, claiming that the papers filed by Merae's counsel did not 
accurately reflect the trial court's rulings, see R 3901. 
F. Merae filed a timely response to James' motion asserting that James waived his 
right to object to the papers filed by Merae's counsel because he did not file 
timely objections as allowed by Rule 7 (f)(2) of the U R Civ P, see R 3923, and 
that a Rule 60 (b) motion was an inappropriate means of objecting to the papers, 
see R 3923. 
* An amended decree was appropriate because a bifurcated decree of divorce was signed on 
July 7th, 2003, see R 1171. 
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G. The trial court denied James' Rule 60 (b) motion on February 21st, 2006, 
stating, in part, that the papers correctly capture the court's findings, see R 4063. 
4. James' Brief at page 34 states that the trial court made no findings regarding the 
$460,000 received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home. This statement is untrue and again 
constitutes improper marshaling. 
At the ruling hearing, the trial court found that the $460,000 ($406,142.55 net) was 
Merae's sole and separate property and gave the following reasons for that finding, see Ruling 
Hearing P 4 and 5. 
A. The funds used to purchase and remodel the Lori Kay Home were Merae's. 
B. When the Lori Kay Home was sold, the funds went back to Merae and every 
action taken thereafter was that the funds were hers. 
C. James made no objection that the funds be placed back into Merae's account. 
D. James made no claim on the funds. 
E. It appears that James assented to the fact that these were Merae's funds that had 
purchased and remodeled the Lori Kay Home and that on sale, Merae was entitled 
to the proceeds. 
The Court's rulings relative to the $460,000 are set forth in the following findings, see R 
3731 and 3732. 
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40. During September of 1997, the parties purchased a home on Lori Kay Drive, 
Holladay, Utah, the "Lori Kay Home" herein, and a vacant lot hereinafter referred 
to as the "Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property", for $379,964.67. 
41. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the 
Fidelity Account. 
42. The Lori Kay Home was remodeled and the entire cost of remodeling was 
paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity Account. 
43. The Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $406,142.55 after real 
estate commissions and closing costs were paid. 
44. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property was not sold and, at the time of trial, 
was held jointly by the parties. 
45. The net proceeds of the sale of the Lori Kay Home were deposited in the 
Fidelity Account and every action taken thereafter shows that the funds were the 
Respondent's sole and separate property. 
46. Petitioner made no objection that the funds received from the sale of the Lori 
Kay Home be placed back into the Fidelity Account nor did he make a claim on 
the said funds, in fact, he assented that it was the Respondent's funds that had 
purchased and remodeled the Lori Kay Home and that, when the Lori Kay Home 
was sold, Respondent was entitled to the proceeds. 
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47. It is reasonable that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home, 
$406,142.55, be the Respondent's sole and separate property. 
5. Another example of misleading and inadequate marshaling is the representation in 
James' Fact No. 17, that monthly payments of $25,335.15 received by Merae, from the sale of 
her 1005 Shares, were deposited in the parities' joint bank accounts. This is a mis-statement of 
the evidence. The true testimony and other evidence are: 
A. The Fidelity Account statements show that the account was opened on 
February 26*, 1996, see Ex P 2040-2047. 
B. The statements show that Merae's Fidelity Account was an individual account, 
not a joint account with James, see Ex P 2048-2059. 
C. The Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies received by Merae from the 
sale of her 1005 Shares, Tr 890 L 10-20 
D. In June of 1995, Merae purchased $224,000 worth of treasury bills, in her 
name only, from money she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, see Ex P 
1977-1980. 
E. When the treasury bills matured, they were cashed by Merae and the cash 
deposited by her in the Fidelity Account, see Tr 818 L 12-20 and Tr 819 L 14-22. 
F. Under the Stock Purchase Agreement, Ex P 2453 at paragraph 6, Merae 
received $25,335.15 each month. 
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G. James testified that Merae received her monthly stock purchase payment 
agreement near the latter part of the month. See Tr 853 L 14-16. 
H. Merae's June 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One Account 
and a check for $23,000 was written to the Fidelity Account and $2,335.15 was 
left in the Bank One Account to pay bills, see Ex P 1627, Tr 851 L 23-25 and Tr 
852 L 1-7. 
I. Merae's November 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One 
Account and a check for $21,000 was written to the Fidelity Account and 
$4,335.15 was left in the Bank One Account to pay bills, see Ex P 1627, and Tr 
853 L 8. 
J. Merae's May 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank 
One Account and a check for $22,000 was written to the Fidelity Account, see Ex 
P 1627 and Tr 853 L 10. 
K. During January of 2002, James told Merae that he was earning good money 
and was the top salesman at MESCO, earning enough to pay family necessities 
and bills, see Tr 1514 L 16-17 and Tr 1515 L 13-24. 
L. Merae's intent was to use the Fidelity Account money for the education of the 
parties' four children and to provide cars, boats, trips, and recreation for the 
family, see Tr 902 L 11 and Tr 1519 L 1-4. 
20 
M. Merae payed off the mortgage on the parties' home at Village Point Way from 
the Fidelity Account, see Tr 1284 L 11-18. 
N. Merae payed $34,000 for a 26 foot Sea Ray boat from her Fidelity Account, 
see the 6/4/99 entry on Ex R 10. 
O. When the boat was demolished in an accident, the insurance company paid 
$30,000 and that sum went into the Fidelity Account, see the 5/8/01 entry on 
E x R l l . 
P. James told Merae that the purchase and remodel of the Lori Kay Home would 
be a very profitable investment, see Tr 1534 L 12-18, Tr 1545 L 12-19, and Tr 
1548 L 10-13. 
Q. Merae purchased the Lori Kay Home by issuing a $379,964.67 check on her 
Fidelity Account, see the 9/15/97 entry on Ex R 16. 
R. All funds utilized to remodel the Lori Kay Home came from the Fidelity 
Account, see Ex R 16 checks to Class One Construction. 
S. When the Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $460,000, the net 
proceeds of $406,142.55 were deposited in the Fidelity Account, see 10/20/98 
entry on Ex R 17. 
T. James made no claim to any of the proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay 
Home, see Tr 704 L 1-3. 
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U. Merae lost approximately $51,000 by purchasing, remodeling, and selling the 
Lori Kay Home, see Ex R 16. 
V. The Odd Piece of Lori Kay Property has questionable value because it is land-
locked, cannot be re-zoned for commercial use, and may not be a legal building 
lot, see Tr 558 L 19-25 and Tr 559 L 1-9. 
W. Merae payed $28,570.94 for a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban from the Fidelity 
Account, see 10/12/99 entry on Ex R 9. 
X. From the funds she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, Merae deposited 
$2,507,873.99 in the Fidelity Account, see Ex R 15. 
Y. At the time of the parties' separation, February of 2002, Merae had a balance 
of approximately $1,055,000 in her Fidelity Account, see Ex P 2049. 
6. Set forth in James' Brief at page 14, paragraph 6, is the statement that "during their 
marriage, both parties freely signed each others names on checks from various accounts....both 
had trading privileges on the parties' stock accounts." As support for these factual statements are 
a Sandy Police Officer report, Ex P 2123; a $252 check written on April 22nd, 1994, Ex P 1625; 
the testimony of Officer Brown at Tr 464 L 16-25 and Tr 465 L 722 and the testimony of James 
at Tr 828 L 9-25. 
Again, James is guilty of misleading marshaling and misrepresenting the evidence. 
Officer Brown testified that Merae communicated to him that over $100,000 was missing from 
her Fidelity Account. When Officer Brown discussed the matter with Greg Bown, Assistant 
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District Attorney, Officer Brown stated that in the his family it was a common practice for a 
husband and wife to sign each other's signatures, deposit checks. James testified that on April 
22nd, 1994, a $252 check was made out and the signature "looks like Merae's", see Tr 828 L 9-
25. The Sandy City Police Report, Ex P 2123 at Page 4 states that "the DA's office would not file 
in this case, because it was too problematic. He indicated that it was common practice for 
husbands and wives to sign each other's names and he believed the funds to be common property 
within the marriage.... plus the account was in both parties names." 
No reference is made in the exhibits or testimony related to the parties' stock trading 
privileges. 
The above examples of failed, incomplete, skewed, and/or misleading marshaling are by 
no means exhaustive. The number and magnitude of such examples demonstrate that such 
instances of failure on the part of James are neither incidental, inadvertent, nor harmless. Rather, 
they are legion, they are material, and they are systematic. In short, they call into serious question 
all of James' factual representations, both what has been included (including whether any given 
factual representation is accurate or placed in proper context) and what has not been included. 
D. WHEN THE APPELLANT DOES NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, SHOULD 
THE APPELLEE DO SO? 
When the Appellant fails to meet the burden of marshaling the evidence, the Appellee is 
on the horns of a dilemma, to use a well known phrase. Should the Appellee point out the 
deficiency of the Appellant and close the brief or should the Appellee marshal the evidence to 
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demonstrate and show the deficiencies of the Appellant's brief?. As an abundance of caution, 
Merae, the Appellee in both of the consolidated cases, has decided to take the second position 
and marshal the evidence on each point made on appeal by James. 
1. James claims that the $2,500,000 received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares 
was not Merae's inheritance. The evidence on this point is 
A. Merae's father, Frank Pardoe, founded Utah Bearing and Fabrication, Inc., see 
Tr 1402 L 3-8. 
B. Mr. Pardoe died in August of L993 Tr 1402 L 7 and 8. 
C. Prior to his death, Mr. Pardoe gave interests in the business to his children, see 
Tr 1402 L 9-25. 
D. Mr. Pardoe gave Merae, who is one of his children, the 1005 Shares, see Tr 
1403 L 16-25 and Ex P 2453. 
E. In 1995, Merae wanted to sell her 1005 Shares, see Tr 1404 L 5-11. 
F. On May 24th, 1995 the corporation agreed to pay Merae $2,500,000 for her 
1005 Shares, see Ex P 2453, payable $500,000 as a down payment and a ten year 
trust deed note, Ex P 2449 for $2,000,000 payable at the rate of $25,335.15 per 
month. 
G. The agreement, Ex P 2453, was signed by Merae, her brother Dirk Pardoe, then 
president of the company, and Thomas KLC, Merae's attorney in the transaction. 
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H. On June 9th, 1997, Merae received $1,697,039.88 as full payment of the 
remaining balance owed under the Stock Purchase Agreement, see Ex P 2451. 
2. James claims that the funds Merae received from the sale of her 1005 shares of Utah 
Bearing lost their character by co-mingling and by the purchase of two parcels of property in 
joint tenancy. The evidence on the co-mingling issue is 
A. James testified that the "half million went into a joint money market for a 
month", see Tr 804 L 6-7, and that "we depleted the money by buying U.S. 
Treasury Bills", see Tr 804 L 8 and 9. 
B. James produced no exhibit showing the existence of the half million dollar 
joint money market account. 
C. Exhibit P 1977 shows that a $100,000 treasury bill was purchased in Merae's 
name only. 
D. Merae testified that it was her intent to keep her inheritance for the childrens' 
education, family entertainment, tennis lessons, and vacations, see Tr 902 L 11 
and 12 and Tr 1519 L 1-4. 
E. Merae testified that she understood from James that his earnings would be used 
to pay monthly living expenses such as the mortgage, utilities, taxes, and things 
like that, see Tr 1514 L 14-20, Tr 1515 L 20-24, and 1516-1517. 
F. Merae wrote a $34,000 check from her Fidelity Account for a 26 foot SeaRay 
boat and trailer, see Tr 1519 L 5-19 and the 6/4/99 entry, check 1126, on Ex R 10. 
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G. Merae wrote a $28,570.94 check from her Fidelity Account for a 1977 
Suburban automobile for use by the family and to pull the boat and trailer, see 
10/12/99 entry on Ex R 9. 
H. The boat and trailer were totaled in an accident and the insurance proceeds of 
$30,000 were deposited in Merae's Fidelity Account, see Ex R 11, 5/8/01 
transaction period. 
L Merae wrote a $35,806.77 check from her Fidelity Account on 8/8/01 to 
purchase a boat to replace the 26 foot Sea Rey that had been totaled, see Ex R 12. 
J. After talking to James, Merae believed that insurance proceeds were sufficient 
to purchase the Replacement Suburban, see Tr 1479 L 9-13. 
K. James forged Merae's name on a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account, 
made payable to Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Jeep, to pay for the Replacement 
Suburban, see last page of Ex R 14. 
L. James told Merae that he was MESCO'S top salesman, see Tr 515 L 18 and 19. 
M. Evidence produced by Merae showed that James did not earn sufficient money 
at MESCO to pay any of the family's expenses, see Ex P 1346, P 1350, P 1354, 
andP1358. 
N, James testified that some of the payments made to Merae under the Stock 
Purchase Agreement were deposited in the parties' joint bank account at Bank 
One, see Tr 851 L 14-20. 
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O. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's 
individual Fidelity Account for $10,000 on January 9th, 1996, see Ex P 2102. 
P. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual 
Fidelity Account for $22,000 on May 23rd, 1996, see Ex P 2102. 
Q. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's 
individual Fidelity Account for $23,000 on June 16*, 1996, see Ex P 2102. 
R. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual 
Fidelity Account for $21,000 on November 25th, 1996, see Ex P 2103. 
S. James wrote a check on the parties' joint account payable to Merae's individual 
Fidelity Account for $18,000 on May 23rd, 1997, see Ex P 2103. 
The evidence related to the two parcels of property in joint tenancy is 
A. Merae wrote a check on September 15th, 1997, from her Fidelity Account for 
the sum of $379,964.67 to buy the Lori Kay Home and Odd piece of Lori Kay 
Property, see 9/15/07 transaction on Ex R 16. 
B. Thereafter, Merae wrote checks for remodeling expenses for the Lori Kay 
Home, see Ex R 16. 
C. Merae did not feel good about putting that much money into the Lori Kay 
Home, see Tr 1536 L 18-25, but James suggested that the home be purchased 
using Merae's inheritance and after making a profit on the home, she would have 
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more money to put into her inheritance, see Tr 1537 L 4-6 and 24-25 and Tr 1538 
L 1 and 2. 
D. The parties talked about getting a conventional loan to purchase the Lori Kay 
Home and James told Merae that his parents would not give him an early 
inheritance, but that he could qualify for a loan based on his earnings but knew 
that Merae did not like paying interest, see Tr 1538 L 12-20. 
E. James told Merae that the Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property could be 
purchased for $20,000, see Tr 1541-1542 L 1 and 2, and re-sold at a profit when 
an easement was obtained, see Tr 1458 L 10-13. 
F. James told Merae that she should be glad she used her inheritance to get the 
Lori Kay Home because she would have more money to put back into her Fidelity 
Account. See Tr 1548 L 1-3. 
G. James told Merae that the Lori Kay Home could be sold for a profit and if the 
back lot was divided, it could be sold for another profit. See Tr 1548 L 10-13. 
H. From her Fidelity Account, on September 15*, 1997, Merae paid $457,146.18 
to purchase and improve the Lori Kay Home, see Ex R 16. 
I. On October 20*, 1998, the Lori Kay Home was sold for $406,142.55, net, and 
that sum was deposited via wire transfer to Merae's Fidelity Account, see Ex 
R17. 
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J. James made no claim to any of the proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay 
Home. 
3. James claims that there was insufficient evidence produced at the trial to show that the 
parties' joint bank accounts were used as conduits for Merae's inheritance, not as repositories in 
which they became co-mingled. The evidence on this issue is 
A. The Fidelity Account was opened to hold monies received by Merae from the 
sale of her 1005 Shares, see Tr 890 L 10-20. 
B. In June of 1995, Merae purchased $224,000 worth of treasury bills, in her name 
only, from money she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, see Ex P 1977-
1980. 
C. When the treasury bills matured, they were cashed by Merae and the cash 
deposited by her in the Fidelity Account, see Tr 818 L 12-20 and Tr 819 L 14-22. 
D. Merae's June 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank 
One account and a check for $23,000 was written by James to the Fidelity 
Account and $2,335.15 was left in the Bank One account to pay bills, see Ex. 
P 1627, Tr 851 L 23-25, and Tr 852 L 1-7. 
E. Merae's November 1996 payment was deposited in the parties' Bank One 
Account and a check for $21,000 was written by James to the Fidelity Account 
and $4,335.15 was left in the Bank One account to pay bills, see Ex. P 1627 and 
Tr 853 L 8. 
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F. Merae's May 1996 payment of $25,335.15 was deposited in the parties' Bank 
One account and a check for $22,000 was written by James to the Fidelity 
Account, see Ex. P 1627 and Tr 853 L 10. 
G. From the funds she received from the sale of her 1005 Shares, Merae deposited 
$2,507,873.99 in the Fidelity Account, see Ex R 15. 
H. At the time of the parties' separation, February of 2002, Merae had a balance 
of approximately $1,055,000 in her Fidelity Account, see Ex P 2049. 
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL AT 
THE TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE CASE TO SHOW THAT JAMES USED THE 
MONEY HE RECEIVED FROM FORGING AND ALTERING CHECKS FOR 
FAMILY PURPOSES, BENEFITTING ALL MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY, 
INCLUDING JAMES. 
Because Merae claimed that James altered and forged checks on her Fidelity Account, she 
had the burden of proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence, see In re:Swans Estate, 
293 P. 2d 682, 686 (Utah 1956). Merae sustained this burden by establishing a) that the Fidelity 
Account was her individual account, see Ex P 2048-2059 b) that James altered checks by 
changing the arabic number 1 to a 4, and writing an "F" in front of the written "One" on six 
checks, see Ex R 13, and forged her signature on nineteen checks, see Ex R 14, c) that James had 
no authority to alter checks signed by Merae and no authority to sign Merae's name to checks on 
her Fidelity Account, see Tr 1510 L 1-3, d) that Merae was not aware that James had forged and 
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altered checks on her Fidelity Account until after the parties' separated in February of 2002, see 
Tr 1510 L 1-3, and e) James did not tell Merae what he did with the $142,647, see Tr 1512 L 1-4. 
Based upon this evidence, the trial court ruled that James, without authorization, signed 
Merae's name to checks and he, without authorization, altered the amount on certain checks, see 
Ruling Hearing P 5 L 5-8. 
With this ruling as a predicate, the trial court entered findings 72, 75, and 76, see R 3735 
and R 3736, which are: 
72. Petitioner, without authorization, forged Respondent's name on Fidelity 
Account checks totaling $142,467 made payable to himself or cash that he 
converted to cash. 
75. Petitioner, without authorization, altered 6 checks given to him by the 
Respondent by increasing them from $1,000 to $4,000. 
76. The alterations reduced Respondent's balance in the Fidelity Account $18,000 
more than Respondent intended when she wrote the checks and gave them to the 
Petitioner. 
James contended that he had the authority to write checks, alter checks, and forge 
Merae's signature on the Fidelity Account, therefore, he had the burden at trial to prove these 
facts, by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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The trial court determined that James did not sustain his burden of proof, and that he 
forged Merae's name without authorization and, as a result, entered findings 72-76, inclusive, see 
R 3735 and 3736. 
James contended at trial that the $142,467 he received by forging Merae's name and 
altering checks was used by him "to pay family expenses." The burden of proof was upon James 
to establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. In this regard, it was his burden to 
prove that his evidence was more credible or entitled to the greater weight and if he failed to do 
so, he did not sustain his burden of proof and this issue must be decided against him, see 
Koeslinger v. Basamakis, 539 P. 2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975). 
The only evidence James produced, in an effort to sustain his burden of proof, was his 
testimony. His statements were not supported by a document, such as a receipt, journal entry, 
cancelled check nor a witness, such as a piano teacher or a tennis instructor who could testify that 
James paid in cash or by a check written on James' account or on Merae's and James' joint 
checking account. 
This lack of evidence supporting and corroborating his testimony is particularly fatal 
because James' credibility as a witness was so badly damaged at the divorce trial by the 
following evidence: 
1. James misrepresented to Larry H. Miller Chrysler Jeep and Zions Bank his year 2000 
income and failed to disclose collection actions and lawsuits pending against him, see Ex 
R6. 
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2. James misrepresented to Merae his years 1998,1999, 2000 and 2001 income, see Tr 
1514 L 17. 
3. At James' suggestion, in August and November of 1996, Merae took $55,000 from her 
Fidelity Account and put it in a joint account with James at American Investment, "The 
Jay Rice Account," see Ex R 18. 
4. During February of 2002, James told Merae that there was $41,000 in the Jay Rice 
Account, see Tr 1470 L 20-25, when in fact it had a zero balance, see Tr 385 L 18-20. 
5. James, during the first part of 2002, asked Mr. Rice to stall Merae when she asked to 
see the Jay Rice Account balance until James could replace the funds he took, see Tr 386 
L 24-25 and Tr 387 L 1-18. 
6. James did not replace the funds he took from the Jay Rice Account, see Tr 1299 L 2-4. 
7. James told Merae that the purchase price of the Replacement Suburban, $30,510.93, 
was paid by insurance proceeds, see Tr 1490 L 16-22. 
8. James forged Merae's name on a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account made 
payable to Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Jeep to pay for the Replacement Suburban and it was 
returned "signature no match," see last page of Ex R 14. 
9. James did not tell Merae that he wrote a $30,510.93 check on her Fidelity Account, see 
Tr 1386 L 17-25 and Tr 1395 L 1-5. 
10. James did not inform Merae that he borrowed $12,555.95 from Zions Bank to 
purchase the Replacement Suburban, see Tr 1499 L 13-16. 
35 
11. James did not inform Merae that he wrote checks payable to Zions Bank to make 
monthly payments on the Replacement Suburban loan by forging her name on her 
Fidelity Account checks, see Tr 1510 L 1-3. 
James' testimony, standing alone, is so slight and unconvincing that Merae's motion to 
amend should have been granted. In ruling on a Rule 59 motion, the trial court should grant the 
motion if it can be reasonably concluded that the evidence supporting a finding is so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the finding unreasonable and unjust. See Rule 59 (a)(6) U R Civ P and 
Sharp v. Williams, 915 P. 2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996). 
IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE DIVORCE 
TRIAL TO SHOW THAT MERAE SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF 
COURT. 
At findings 100, 101 and 102, see R 3740, the trial court determined that Merae was in 
contempt of court for failing to provide information to James about the children's activities, 
removing the children from school, interfering with parent-time, etc. 
There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support these findings. Prior to the 
commencement of the trial, the parties, after nearly three full days of intense negotiations, 
entered into a stipulation and agreement relative to custody of the minor children and related 
matters. In the trial court's order that memorialized the parties' agreement, R 3526, it is clearly 
stated at paragraph 12 that all matters related to custody of the minor children and related matters 
were settled and that the only issues reserved for trial were: 
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A. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the 
same. 
B. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court appointed 
evaluation, including the costs for any and all experts from both parties 
concerning the custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved. 
C. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same. 
In accord with the foregoing, James had the burden to show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, 1) that the issue of contempt was reserved for trial, 2) that Merae knew of orders of the 
court relative to child custody and parent-time matters, 3) that she had the ability to comply, and 
4) willfully and knowingly refused to do so, none of which was proven by the clear and 
convincing standard. 
A reasonable interpretation of the order is that all issues pending between the parties 
relating to custody, parent-time, and related matters were settled and the only issues reserved for 
trial were those set forth in the order. Issues of contempt were not reserved, therefore, they were 
settled, not to be considered by the trial court. 
V. JAMES' COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 11 
(B)(3) U R CIV P. 
During the divorce trial, a Larry H. Miller Group Automobile Loan Application, Ex R 6, 
was received in evidence as a document kept in the normal course of business by the Larry H. 
Miller Group. 
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Ex R 6 was filled out by James, see Tr 1278 L 15-21. The document was signed by 
James, on December 29, 2000, see Tr 1278 L 25 and Tr 1279 L 1-2. Testimony given by David 
Ingles, a representative of the Larry H. Miller Group, was to the effect that Ex R 6 was completed 
by James and submitted to the Larry H. Miller Group and Zions Bank in connection with his 
request for a loan to purchase a 1997 Chevrolet Suburban, see Tr 1387 L 15-22 and Tr 1388 L 5-
12. The last line of the "Applicant" section of Ex R 6, states that James' trade or occupation is 
"sales" and his gross monthly income is "$60,000." 
Section VIII "Credit Application", at page 13-14 of the memorandum signed by Wendy J. 
Lems, attorney for James, on November 10th, 2005, R 3842-3, states that "At time of trial, the 
Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application meant "per year" and 
such was a mere inadvertence." A thorough review of the trial transcript of the testimony of 
James shows that he did not testify concerning the gross monthly income section of Ex R 6 nor 
did he testify concerning any other information contained in said exhibit. 
The only testimony given by James at the time Ex R 6 was introduced in evidence is 
found at Tr 1278 L 4-24 that reads: 
Q Graduate from high school though? 
A Yes. 
Q You read and write the English language? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you take any math classes in college? 
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A I did. 
Q Tell the Court what math classes you took? 
A I took algebra. 
Q So you're familiar with simple math and higher math? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q And I'm handing you what's been marked as Exhibit 6 and ask you if you can 
identify that? Let me help you with it a little bit. Isn't that the loan application that 
you filled out at Larry Miller when the check that you delivered to them for 
$30,000 was returned by Fidelity because the signature didn't match? 
A I believe that's correct. 
Q As a matter of fact it bears your signature down at the bottom where it says 
applicant's signature, correct? 
A Correct. 
By executing the memorandum on November 10th, 2005, James' counsel certified, to the 
best of her knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under 
circumstances, that the factual contentions in the memorandum have evidentiary support. Merae 
filed her motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(3) because there is no evidentiary support for the 
factual contention that James testified that the "per month" reference on his credit application 
meant "per year." 
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Pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(A) U R Civ P, Merae's motion for sanctions, with a supporting 
memorandum, see R 3959-3964, describing the specific conduct alleged to violate subsection (b) 
of Rule 11, was served upon James' counsel, but not filed with the Court. In response to the 
motion, James' counsel reiterated that James had corrected Ex P 6 at trial, see R 3944-3950. 
Twenty one days after service of the motion and because the challenged paper was not withdrawn 
or appropriately corrected, Merae's motion for sanctions was filed with the trial court, see R 
3966. 
The trial court denied Merae's motion by the minute entry dated February 21st, 2006, see 
R 4063, stating that "Whether the petitioner intended to inflate his monthly or yearly income is 
unclear and open to different views of the evidence on that point. Consequently, the petitioner's 
representations about the evidence that take one view to the exclusion of the other is appropriate. 
There does not appear to be an intention to mislead or misrepresent." 
The trial court erred in denying Merae's motion for Rule 11 sanctions because the 
evidence is clear and uncontroverted that James' counsel intentionally misrepresented a material 
fact to mislead the trial court. 
VI. JAMES FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN BOTH THE 
DIVORCE CASE AND THE FRAUD CASE 
In the divorce case, James alleged that the funds received by Merae from the sale of the 
1005 Shares was part of the marital estate because 1] they were received during the marriage and 
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2] they were neither inheritance nor gift, see R 7, therefore, he had the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, these facts. 
In the fraud case, Merae alleged that James forged and altered her Fidelity Account 
checks, that his acts constituted fraud and that he was unjustly enriched by his conduct, see FR 
17. In response, James denied the allegations of Merae's complaint and as affirmative defenses 
thereto averred that 1] he was Merae's express, implied, or apparent agent in all financial matters 
2] all monies in the Fidelity Account went to pay marital debts, Merae's excessive spending 
habits and to support and care for the parties' children 3] none of the money in the Fidelity 
Account was used for the sole purpose of benefitting James, see FR 248. In addition, James filed 
a counterclaim that he did not pursue. 
It is an elementary rule of law that the burden of proof on any point is upon the party 
asserting it. Stated another way is, the burden of proof is on the one having the affirmative of the 
issue. In Re: Swan's Estate, infra; In Re: Wright's Estate v. Wright, 228 P. 2d 911, 914 (Kansas 
1951); Gibson v. Gibson, 340 P. 2d 190,191 (Oregon 1959). 
"The Plaintiff must present evidence first, because it is the Plaintiff that must establish a 
prime facie case, that if unchallenged, is sufficiently proved to justify the granting of relief."... 
"At that point, the Defendant may either challenge the prima facie sufficiency of the Plaintiffs 
case or go forward with the Defendant's evidence."... "In most civil cases, the party with the 
burden of proof must prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a less rigorous 
standard than the "clear and convincing" standard for some civil cases, such as fraud, or the 
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standard for criminal cases of "beyond a reasonable doubt." David A. Thomas, Utah Civil 
Practice §11.07[2][c] (LexisNexis 2003). 
Discussing presumptions, In Re: Swan *s Estate cited above, the Utah Supreme Court 
indicated "[ojrdinarily the burden of persuasion, as distinguished from the burden of making a 
prima facie case from which the fact finder could reasonably find the issue in his favor, is on the 
party whose claim for relief depends on the existence of such fact." 
Applying the In Re: Swan's Estate case to the divorce case, James had the burden of 
proof on each of his claims. 
1. James claimed that funds received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares is part of 
the marital estate because 1) they were received during the marriage and 2) they are neither 
inheritance nor gift, therefore, he has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
these facts. 
2. James claimed that Merae's funds lost their identity through commingling, therefore, 
he has the burden of proving this fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail. 
3. James claimed that the funds received by Merae from the sale of her 1005 Shares were 
increased as a result of his efforts, therefore, he has the burden of proving this fact, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail. 
4. James contended that he had the authority to right checks and forge Merae's signature 
on said checks on her Fidelity Account, therefore, he has the burden to prove this fact, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, in order to prevail. On this issue as well as those set forth at 
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paragraphs 1,2, and 3 above, James must prove that his evidence is more credible or entitled to the 
greater weight and if he fails to do so, he has failed to sustain his burden of proof. 
5. James contended that he was given the authority by Merae to alter six $1,000 checks 
making them $4,000 checks, therefore, the burden of proof is upon him to establish this fact by a 
preponderant of the evidence. In this regard also, he must prove that his evidence is more credible 
or entitled to the greater weight and if he fails to do so, he has not sustained his burden of proof 
and this issue must be decided against him. 
In addition to the In Re: Swan's Estate case, there are other supreme court cases that are in 
accord. 
The proponent of a proposition has two burdens relative to his proof: to produce evidence 
which proves or tends to prove the proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier of fact that his 
evidence is more credible or entitled to the greater weight. Once the proponent has produced such 
evidence, the burden of producing evidence disproving or tending to disprove the proposition 
shifts to the opponent, and he must introduce such evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk 
of a directed verdict or a peremptory finding against him as to the existence of the proposition. 
Koeslingv. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975). 
The party having the risk of non-persuasion is naturally the one upon whom first falls this 
duty of going forward with the evidence. Upon meeting their duty of going forward with evidence 
that all authorized stock had been issued before the issuance of plaintiffs' stock certificate, 
plaintiffs made out a prima facie case. Thereupon, the burden, in the second meaning of the 
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phrase, shifted to the defendants, but the risk of non-persuasion, which never shifts, remained 
with plaintiffs. Kartchner v. Home, 262 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1953). 
Paragraph 1. A. through H. above that begins at page 24 of this Brief shows that James 
failed to sustain his burden of proving that the $2,500,000 Merae received from the sale of her 
1005 Shares was a marital asset. 
The law applicable to the issue of what property is marital or separate requires the trial 
court to characterize the property of the parties and donated or inherited property is generally 
considered separate property. "In distributing property in divorce proceedings, trial courts are first 
required to properly categorize the parties' property as marital or separate." Elman v. Elman, 2002 
Utah App. 83, f 18,45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002) citing Kelly v. Kelly, 2000 Utah App. 236, f 
24,9 P. 3d 171. Generally, trial courts are also required to award premarital property, and 
appreciation on that property, to the spouse who brought the property in to the marriage. Id. 
"Inherited or donated property, as well as its appreciated value, is generally regarded as 
separate from the marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse in a property division 
incident to divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 
304,308 (Utah 1988). 
Separate property does not become marital property unless the other spouse has 
augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property. See Mackey v. Mackey, 202 Utah App. 
349,2002 WL 3138774 [Unpublished opinion]. The facts of the divorce case show that James 
altered checks on Merae's Fidelity Account and forged her signature on checks payable to him or 
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to cash. By so doing, rather than augmenting Merae's Fidelity Account, he decreased it, rather 
then maintaining, he manipulated it, and rather then protecting, he raided it. 
Applying the law to the facts of the fraud case, it follows that because Merae alleged that 
James altered and forged checks on her Fidelity Account and was unjustly enriched by his 
conduct, she had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence that this occurred. If 
she failed to sustain her burden of proof, her complaint against James would be subject to a 
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 (a) of the UR Civ P. If, however, Merae sustained her 
burden, then James must produce evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
did not forge or alter checks on Merae's Fidelity Account, he forged and altered Fidelity Account 
checks with Merae's permission, that he acted as her agent, that the money obtained by forging 
and altering Merae's checks was used for family purposes and not for the sole benefit of James. 
Merae sustained her burden by producing the following evidence: 
A. Merae testified that she gave FEx P 7 to James as $1,000 checks made payable to him, 
see FTr 229 L 18-22. 
B. Merae testified that when she gave FEx 1-7 to James, she intended to give him $1,000 
for each check, see F Tr 229 L 18-25 and F Tr 230 L 1-6. 
C. James testified that he received FEx P 1-7 from as $1,000 checks made payable to him 
and that he changed the arabic 1 on each check to a 4 and wrote an "F" in front of the 
"one" on each check and received $4,000 from each check, see Tr 1277 L 13-25. 
D. James admitted, during his testimony on August 22nd, 2006, that he signed his then 
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wife's name "Merae Kimball" to the following Fidelity Account checks made payable to 
either "James Kimball" or "Cash" that were received in evidence during the fraud trial: 
FEx P 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,23,24,25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,41,45, and 46. 
See FTr 61-90. 
E. When pressed as to what he did with the $4,000 he received from FEx P 5, James stated 
that "it possibly paid closing costs on Lori Kay Home," see F Tr 22 L 19-25. 
F. FEx P 5 was given to James by Merae on January 29th, 2000. 
G. The closing on the Lori Kay Home purchase was in September of 1997, see Ex 16, and 
the closing on the Lori Kay sale was in October of 1998, see Ex 17. 
H. Merae testified that prior to the date the parties separated in February of 2002, she had 
no knowledge that James had signed her name on Fidelity Account checks or that he had 
altered the $1,000 Fidelity Account checks she gave him, see F Tr 230 L 7-12 and F Tr 
240 L 17-19. 
I. Merae testified that she never gave James permission to sign her name on Fidelity 
Account checks, see F Tr 240 L 17-19. 
J. Merae testified that she never gave James permission to alter the Fidelity Account 
checks she gave him, see F Tr 238 L 18-20. 
K. After the parties' separation, in February of 2002, Merae became aware that James had 
forged her signature on her Fidelity Account checks and had altered the $1,000 checks she 
gave him, to be $4,000 checks, see F Tr 230 L 7-12. 
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L. Merae testified that she confronted James about the altered and forged checks on her 
Fidelity Account and he refused to tell to her, see F Tr 240 L 24 and 25, F Tr 241 L 1 
and 2. 
M. The first time Merae knew that James was the person who had altered and forged her 
Fidelity Account checks was on December 15th, 2004, when she heard him testify in the 
divorce trial, see Tr 1277 L 13-25. 
N. The first time she knew that James claimed he used the money he received from 
altering and forging her Fidelity Account checks to pay family related expenses was on 
December 15th, 2004 when she heard him testify at the divorce trial, see Tr 1276 L 3-11. 
O. James testified on August 22nd, 2006 in the fraud case that he altered and forged checks 
on Merae's Fidelity Account, see F Tr 16 L 19-21; F Tr 19 L 9-11; F Tr 29 L 1-11. 
P. James testified on August 22nd, 2006 at the trial in the fraud case that: 
1. He understood that he had authority to sign checks on Merae's Fidelity Account, 
seeFTr l6L3-6 . 
2. He never signed a check on the Fidelity Account "James L. Kimball" or "James 
Lewis Kimball", see F Tr 16 L 15-18, and on every check he signed on the account, 
he signed Merae's name, see F Tr 19 L 19-21. 
3. He altered the following checks to obtain $4,000 instead of $1,000: 
a. FExP 5, seeFTr 18 L 11-25 andFTr 19. 
b. Merae may have altered P 5, see F Tr 19 L 9-14. 
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c. FEx P 1 - James "possibly" changed the 1 to a 4, see F Tr 29 L 4-5. 
d. FEx P 2 - James "possibly" changed the 1 to a 4, see F Tr 32 L 5-7. 
e. FEx P 3 - James testified that "I may have. Its possible" that he changed 
t he l t oa4 , s eeFTr34L9-12 . 
f. FEx P 4 - James testified that he may have altered the check by stating 
"may have; its possible" that he put the "F" in front of the "one" on the 
second line of the check and changed the arabic 1 to a 4, see F Tr 36 L 19-
23. 
g. FEx P 6- James testified that "its possible" that he altered the check, see 
F Tr 38 L 22-25 and F Tr 39 L 1-8. 
h. FEx P 7- James testified "I don't recall, but I may have" put a capital "F" 
in front of the word "one" before receiving $4,000 for it, see F Tr 41 L 9-12 
and L 18-25. 
Q. As the foregoing paragraph 3. a. through h. shows, on August 22nd, 2006, when James 
was asked about altering and forging Fidelity Account checks, his answers were peppered 
with evasive answers such as "possibly", "I may have", "It's possible", and "I don't 
recall", however, on December 15th, 2004 in the divorce case, James admitted altering 
those checks, see Tr 1277 L 13-25. 
R. James earned $600 in the year 2000, see FEx 640, and $1,748 in the year 2001, see FEx 
641 and FTr 202. 
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S. James considered the money in the Fidelity Account to be his money and Merae's 
money, see F Tr 201 L 8-20. 
T. During the year 2000, the Kimball family lived on the $600 James earned and the 
Fidelity Account, see F Tr 201 L 21-25. 
U. James did not tell Merae that he only earned $600 in the year 2000, see F Tr 204 L 
20-25. 
V. In the year 2001, James earned $1,748, F Tr 204 L 17-19, but did not divulge that fact 
to Merae, see F Tr 204 L 20-25. 
W. James did not tell Merae that he had changed the $1,000 checks she gave him to 4,000 
checks, see F Tr 238 L 21-23. 
X. Merae testified that she did not give James permission or authority to alter the checks 
she gave him, see F Tr 238 L 15-20. 
Merae presented her case-in-chief on August 22nd and 23rd, 2006. During those two days, 
she produced testimony and exhibits showing that between October of 1999 and December of 
2001, James altered and forged 24 checks on the Fidelity Account, payable to "Cash" or "James 
Kimball" that totaled $54,800. 
As part of Merae's presentation, James was asked if he had any evidence to show what he 
did with the money he received from altering and forging Merae's Fidelity Account checks and he 
stated the his evidence was in his lawyers' trial notebooks, see F Tr 28 L 1-7. The Court did not 
allow James to go through the notebooks, while he was on the stand, to assemble his evidence, see 
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FTr28L8-10. 
To sustain his burden of proving that he used the money he received by altering and 
forging Fidelity Account checks for family purposes, James presented checks that he wrote 
between October of 1999 and December of 2001 on his Bank One account. The total of those 
checks was $52,398.30 of which $44,587.19 were written to "Cash" or "James Kimball" see F Tr 
181-183. 
After considering the evidence, the trial court ruled that James had forged and altered 
Merae's Fidelity Account checks that he was unjustly enriched thereby and that Merae was 
entitled to a judgment in the sum of $54,800 plus pre and post judgment interest, see F Tr 502. 
VII. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPERLY AWARDED 
Under Utah case law, prejudgment interest can be awarded if the loss is fixed at a definite 
time and the interest can be calculated, see Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P. 2d 1206,1212 
(Utah App. 1997). This case and others are discussed in the trial court's memorandum decision, 
see F R 763. 
VIII. THE DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEE WAS PROPER 
Both parties requested that the trial court award them costs and attorney's fees and in 
considering their requests, the trial court analyzed the factors set forth at Utah Code Ann §78-27-
56 (Supp, 1988) which, applied to the divorce case, are: 
1. Did the party prevail on the main issue of the case? 
2. Were the fees sought reasonable? 
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3. Did the party have a need? 
In exercising its sound discretion, the trial court denied both parties' requests for their 
attorney's fees and costs based upon the evidence presented at the divorce trial. 
The trial court determined, as to James, that: 
1. He did not prevail on the main issue of the case, see Ruling Hearing P 12 L 19-23. 
2. The fees sought were not reasonable or necessary, see Ruling Hearing P 12 L 5-8. 
3. James did not have a need because his fees were paid for him by his parents and he is 
not legally bound to pay back his parents, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L 6-10.* 
The trial court determined, as to Merae, that: 
1. She prevailed on the main issue of the case, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L 11-12. 
2. The fees she sought were unreasonable and unnecessary because this is a case that "got 
out of hand." See Ruling Hearing P 12 L 12-14. 
3. With the funds she was awarded, she does not have a need, see Ruling Hearing P 13 L 
11-13. 
4. James does not have the ability to pay Merae's costs and fees, see Ruling Hearing P 13 
L 13-14. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, analyses, and case law, Merae urges that this 
* James failed to produce a promissory note or any other evidence of his obligation to his parents. 
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appellate court enter a decision: 
1. Allowing the trial court's findings in both the divorce case and the fraud case to stand 
because James has failed in his basic threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence. 
2. Granting Merae a judgment against James in the amount of $142,467 in the divorce case 
or, in the alternative, upholding her judgment against James in the fraud case.* 
3. Reversing the trial court order holding Merae in contempt of court. 
4. Ruling that James' counsel violated Rule 11 of U R Civ P and remanding the issue to 
the trial court for determining the appropriate sanction. 
DATED this I f day of June, 2008. 
<> 
omas R. Blonquist 
Attorney fof Merae 
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* Merae's prayer is in the alternative because she is not entitled to both judgments. 
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